Introduction
Over the past thirteen years, the conflict in Syria has led
to between0.6 and 1 million deaths and the displacement
of over thirteen million people, including as both
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs)
From 2011 to 2024, there have been significant changes
in political and military influence. As a result, Syria was
divided into three distinct areas of political control: (1)
The central, coastal, and southern areas were under
Syrian regime control; (2) northwest Syria (NWS),
including parts of Idlib and Aleppo governorates,
under opposition or rebel control; (3) northeast Syria
(NES), including parts of al-Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir
ez-Zor, was under the control of the Autonomous
Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). The
toppling of the Assad regime on 8th December 2024 has
changed this with almost all of Syria, now under
opposition control. In some ways, this important political
change has datedsome of the content of this commentary,
however, it remains relevant as we capture some of the
key issues of how the response to the February 2023
earthquakes was politicised when Damascus was under
the former regime. Therefore, the focus of this
commentary is on the region formerly known as NWS which was particularly affected by the February 2023
earthquakes[2].
The severe earthquakes which affected south-eastern
Turkey and northern Syria in February 2023 led to
widespread devastation from which, populations in both
these areas are arguably still recovering. NWS, which
wasessentially besieged between the Turkish border on
one side and an impermeable front-line on the other, was
particularly affected with this compound crisis occuring
on top of multiple other stressors which included forced
displacement, ongoing attacks and insecurity, attacks on
health, economic crises, funding cuts and a deteriorating
health crisis[2], [3].
What was apparent was that after thirteen years of
protracted conflict and ongoing humanitarian crises, there
was limited localisation of the cross-border humanitarian
response to the area such that the 5-6 million affected
were mostly left to fend for themselves for eight days in
its aftermath [4]. This contrasts starkly with other
disasters such as the 2010 Haiti earthquake when 27
countries offered emergency teams within 24 hours and 6
of them were operational inside the country within 48
hours [5].
Challenges in Response to the Earthquakes
Coordination and Access
Access to NWS was significantly disrupted following the
earthquakes, particularly due to the damage sustained to
highways in southern Turkey. Notably, the main crossing
from south-eastern Turkey to northwest Syria via Bab
Al-Hawa, the only UN-approved international aid
corridor at that time, was affected [6]. Despite this, an
interactive map from the logistics cluster in Gaziantep
indicated no impediments to aid arriving from the UN
hub near Reyhanli, located just 5 km from Bab Al-Hawa
This suggests that the initial closure of the Bab Al-Hawa
crossing for the first 48 hours was not due to a lack of
supplies but likely a result of Turkey’s own disaster
related challenges and the absence of sufficient
international pressure for immediate access[7]
Consequently, it was not until late on February 13th,
seven days post-earthquake, that the UN secured
approval from Syria’s then president to open additional
border crossings, facilitating much-needed access to the
affected areas [8].The first UN aid only entered
northwest Syria from Bab al-Salama, one of the newly
opened crossings, on 14th February, eight days after the
earthquake [9].
Politics, sovereignity and funding
The delay waiting for approval from the
regime to send aid to affected areas in NWS was
controversial. Legally, the UN did not need to seek such
permission and could have bypassed this to ensure life
saving aid reached affected communities
2022, Amnesty International had already highlighted UN
guidance stating that international organisations can
conduct temporary humanitarian relief operations without
the consent of conflicting parties in exceptional
situations, to provide life-saving supplies to civilians in
extreme need, if no alternatives exist and it does not
seriously impair the country’s territorial integrity
The UN also coordinates search and rescue efforts
through the United Nations Disaster Assessment and
Coordination (UNDAC). UNDAC teams can reach
anywhere worldwide within 12 to 48 hours of a request
[12]. This was the case in Turkey and Syrian
government-held areas but not in the
[13]. The UN Under-Secretary-General, Martin Griffiths,
stated that 4,948 search and rescue experts were
mobilised through the UNDAC mechanism in less than
72 hours to respond to the earthquakes in Turkey and Syria. However, none of them were deployed to
NWS[14]. In the aftermath of these delays, Martin
Griffiths apologised to the Syrian people when he visited
the Syrian-Turkish border on 12
stating,“We have so far failed the people of north
Syria. They rightly feel abandoned. Looking for
international help that hasn’t arrived”
Local and international resources were predominantly
directed towards supporting the disaster responses in
Turkey. As of 9th February, 95 countries and 16
international organisations had pledged aid to Turkey
with 6,479 rescue personnel from 56 countries already in
Turkey; at that time there was no support to
for six trucks carrying food and non
World Food Programme that was already scheduled
before the earthquake[16]. The humanitarian needs in
NWS at the time were considerable, given the
population’s prolonged exposure to conflict. While the
challenges faced in Turkey were significant, the situation
in NWS was equally dire. The discrepancy in the
humanitarian response on either side of the Turkish
border may have contributed to preventable deaths in
NWS. This disparity was exacerbated by the fact that
donations from countries and other entities were
predominantly channelled to international NGOs such as
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC). These organisations typically
operate through the sovereign state, such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and its
Syrian counterpart, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent
(SARC) [17], which has had no access to NWS since
2020,with much criticism directed at SARC, including
accusations of corruption and collusion with the
Syrian regime in the collective punishment policyagainst
areas outside its control including NWS
Localization in Humanitarian Response
The example of the earthquake response to NWS remains
relevant as is demonstrates not only the impact of
corruption on such life-saving, urgent responses but also
the essential role which localization has in areas which
are essentially besieged.
process of transferring funding, responsibility, and power
from international organizations to local humanitarian
actors, something which goes beyond simple
geographical localisation[19]
the need for local entities to
efforts, as they are oftennimbler, trusted by local
communities, have better contextual knowledge, have
greater reach to affected communities
high-risk settings – and often have lower overheads, making them more efficient [20].The localization concept
has been discussed for several decades. However,
itgained significant traction following the 2016 World
Humanitarian Summit, which emphasized the importance
of empowering local actors[21]. Despite these calls, the
international humanitarian system has struggled to shift
the power dynamics and funding structures to adequately
support local organizations.Though this goes beyond
funding, it is estimated that only 1.2% of humanitarian
funding goes to local and national organisations, as of
2022 [22].
Localization in Syria
Though discussions about localisation of the
humanitarian response in NWS have been ongoing since
2020, it has been met with limited success. In the wake of
the earthquakes, given the devastation in Turkey,
including Gaziantep, where the WHO-led health cluster
for cross-border humanitarian aid to NWS is based, this
was paralysed in the immediate aftermath of the
earthquakes [23]. This gap inthe leadership and
coordination role of the health cluster in the very needed
moment further highlighted the significant need to build
local capabilities. Humanitarians based on both sides of
the border were themselves affected, interrupting their
operations to NWS[24], [25].The international
humanitarian organisation and UN responses were
restricted, delayed and inadequate resulting in the further
deaths and injuries beyondthe immediate, leaving those
inNWS with knowledge that they are neglected
top of this, there was very limited capacityinside NWS
on the day of the earthquakes. This was partly due to a
lack of localisation combined with other
failed international early response; for example,
was also an absence of the required heavy equipm
needed for search and rescueand a lack of fuel and
medical supplies in the hospitals, suggesting that
preparedness for such scenarios is also essential for these
essentiallybesieged areas [27].Effective disaster risk
reduction and preparedness are essential in responding to
such catastrophic events. Moreover, at these times,
mechanisms to open border crossings for the sake of
access and bypassing sovereign states and their
institutions for areas outside of their control must be
rapidly activated [28].
The earthquake example is just one of many that indicate
the need for empowering local actors; another was
response to COVID-19 when NWS was
months in its aftermath[29]. The COVID
Idlibs governorate highlighted several
particularly the importance of local ownership and priority setting. Local-level coordination and community
engagement, as seen with civil society groups, volunteer
organisations, and the local health directorate, proved
essential[30]. Despite limited international support, local
health leadership established quarantine and isolation
centres mobilized volunteers and ran awareness
campaigns to support the overburdened health sector
Given the critical role of local actors in these
is imperative to support them in planning, owning, and
leading these efforts[31]
worthwhile, particularly in protracted crises where
funding shortfalls force international organisations to
reduce activities or pull out [32]
NWS which wereessentially besieged, localisation is
therefore not only conceptually important but also
lifesaving as seen after the earthquakes.Despite limited
resources, local organisations are often better positioned
to navigate the complex terrain and provide immediate,
life-saving assistance [33].
In the global humanitarian system, there remains an
imperative for funding, responsibility and power to be
transferred more directly to local humanitarian
organisations, bypassing some of the traditional actors
which have dominated humanitarian response; these
include international organisations
organizationsmay, as in the
capacity building and support to develop a track record in
being able to access funding from key donors.
Investment in local organisations is essential for the
sustainability of responses in complex, protracted crises
and for development, as emphasised in the T
Nexus.This refers to the integrated approach of
combining humanitarian, development, and
peacebuilding efforts to address complex crises more
holistically[35]. This dual
localization and the Triple Nexus, aims to ensure that
immediate relief efforts are complemented by long
development and peacebuilding initiatives, thus reducing
aid dependency by encouraging people affected to
rapidly shift from emergency mode to income generation
[36]. Additionally, it enhances foste
recovery, local ownership andbuilding legitimate systems
in alignment with people’s culture, resources, and
beliefs.
The need for localization in a similar context, the Gaza example
The lessons from NWS’s earthquake response underline the necessity of bolstering local capacities and supporting
local healthcare workers and responders in Gaza to
ensure a more resilient and responsive humanitarian
framework. This was clearly demonstrated in
response by local organisations includi
Directorate and the Syrian Civil Defence (White
Helmets) in the wake of the earthquakes, without whom,
there was the potential for even more lives to be lost.
Though international organisations may have greater
funds at their disposal and may be better able to respond
rapidly in acute crises, their role in the humanitarian
space is arguably changing, particularly where access is
restricted, and they may be comparatively risk averse
Many have become so large that they are less agile, may
face restrictions across borders, particularly in besieged
areas such as Gaza, be less willing to take security risks
compared to local humanitarian organisations and often
lack local contextual knowledge or trust with local
communities [37]. Gaza, like NWS
restricted access and severe security risks, due to the
current escalation of attacks by Israel since October
2023, that impede international humanitarian respo
[38]. These access issues compromise the international
community’s ability to provide timely and effective aid.
The situation in Gaza has been even more complicated
due to the rapid evolution of attacks on health facilities
and infrastructure, multiple forced displacement of the
population and severely restricted access
[41].The UN has accused Israel of imposing “unlawful
restrictions” on humanitarian operations such as blocked
land crossings and routes, communications blackouts and
air strikes [42]. According to WFP’s Deputy Executive
Director, Carl Skau, the challenging operating
environment makes it near-impossible for humanitarian
operations to deliver urgently needed food aid
such, though international organisations hav
whether through long-term projects or ‘fly
‘medical or surgical missions’ they do not in themselves
build the capacity of local systems. However, their direct
support may address a significant gap in the most acute,
severe phases of conflict as seen now in Gaza and
previously in Syria.
Conclusion
The earthquakes in former NWS exposed significant gaps
in the international humanitarian response, emphasising
the critical need for localisation and preparedness in
complex crises. Similar challenges are evident in other
besieged areas like Gaza, where local responders and
organisations play a crucial role. Moving forward, the
global humanitarian system must support funding shifts and empowerment of local entities to enhance their
capacity and ensure more effective and sustainable
responses to emergencies. The international community
must also advocate for mechanisms that facilitate rapid
access to besieged areas, bypassing political impediments
to deliver timely aid. For Syria,
another earthquake or disaster
NWS, the response will be different given the fall of the
regimeas there will be the possibility
response to occur through
this, for lessons learned from the earthquake response to
NWS, we argue that investing in local humanitarian
actors not only addresses immediate needs but also builds
long-term resilience in communities facing protracted
conflicts and crises, supporting future development i
early recovery.
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